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IS SECULARISM SO GOOD FOR WOMEN? 
Marc Jacquemain – University of Liege 
 In a very well-known essay, Susan Möller Okin (1999) asks: « Is multiculturalism bad for 
women ». The argument is straightforward: protecting minority culture is a valuable 
normative ideal, but it may enter in contradiction with an overarching ideal for democrats: 
equal treatment and respect for all individuals, and in particular equal respect and treatment 
for men and women. For many cultures do not treat men and women equally, and, on the 
whole, (at least according to Okin), western cultures are at the moment the less patriarchal 
ones. So, granting special protection to minority cultures within western countries could 
easily amount to worsen the situation of women inside the minority groups by reinforcing 
the grip of more patriarchal social norms. Examples are also well-known, the most often 
quoted being the practice of genital mutilations on little girls in some African countries. 
This is a troubling question, because it reminds us that two values which most of us consider 
as extremely important, respect for cultures and respect for individuals, may often clash. At 
least, they may clash if we consider not only individual cultural rights (the right for 
individuals to follow their cultural practices as long as they do not harm any other 
individuals), but also group rights, i.e. the rights for communities to organize their lives along 
their own group rules, which means the possibility to impose some burdens on the 
individuals (especially the women) who are part of the group. 
The argument of Okin is fundamental (we cannot just discard it), and at the same time 
disputable (the notion of what a burden is cannot altogether be considered as completely 
independent from culture). There have been many rejoinders and many responses and this 
is not the subject matter of this paper. 
But in the context of rising xenophobia in Europe, this argument has been used as a 
powerful weapon to dismiss and attack Islam as an « unacceptable » religion, contrary to any 
reasonable conception of equality between men and women. This attack has taken various 
forms, according to the « national ethos » of different countries: Christian Joppke (2009) 
compares the way the « veil controversy » developed in France, Britain and Germany, and he 
shows that the claim of « Christian Identity » in Germany displays more or less the same 
functional role as « laïcité » in France1. So, in the case of France, and to some extent in 
Belgium, secularism2 is presented within the public debate as the shield that aims at 
protecting Muslim women against the heavy patriarchal stance of their own 
religious/cultural « community ». This « alliance » between secularism and feminism against 
Islam (and very secondarily, Catholicism) can be presented as the main ideological grid 
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 Assuming that while the « political treatment » of the veil for pupils in France can be accommodated within a 
liberal frame, the question of the veil for teachers in Germany is fundamentally illiberal. 
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according to which relations between gender, secularism and democracy are framed3 within 
the French and Belgian public debates. 
There is at least one circumstantial reason to be sceptical about this « storytelling »: it has 
become a central narrative within the propaganda of radical right populism. Especially in 
France, the leader of the Front National, Marine Le Pen seems to have accomplished a 
sudden conversion to both secularism and feminism. It may seem odd: the FN has since the 
beginning defended at the same time traditional roles for women and the most traditionalist 
catholicism. The figure the Front promotes as the symbolic representation of France in all its 
demonstrations is Joan of Arc, who displays the example of the heroic nationalist warrior 
inspired by God. It is difficult to imagine a narrative that would be more opposed to the 
« feminist/secularist » alliance. So, even if this ideological move is, most probably, partly 
strategic, it is a true « conversion » within the radical right and it leads to the marginalization 
of some important ideological options of the party4. This move has already had some effects 
within some fringes of the feminist movement. Somebody as important among feminists as 
Elisabeth Badinter declared as soon as September 2011 that: « Unfortunately Marine Le Pen 
was the last politician in France to defend ‘laïcité’ »
5.  
The aim of this paper is precisely to raise some questions about to which extent this 
« alliance » between feminism and secularism is a genuine one and to explore what the 
« function6 » of this « frame » could be within the ideological context of Europe. I will mainly 
stick to the context of French speaking Belgium, which I know best, but this will need some 
references to the situation in other European countries, mainly France.  
1. The school wars: the first move toward a secular(ized) society (± 1850-1960) 
What is a « secular society »? The first distinction that I would like to draw should be 
straightforward: « secularism » is not « secularization ». While the first concept refers to 
constitutional arrangements (separation between the State and religion), the second 
describes an empirical sociological process: the loss of salience and importance of religion 
within a society. A simple example can make the difference evident: until very recently 
Sweden was not a formally secular State, for it had Lutheranism as a State religion until 
2000. But Sweden is, like all Lutheran societies, a very secularized society, in which religious 
practice asymptotically tends to zero and where religion very weakly influences collective 
beliefs or daily life. On the contrary, the United States is a strongly secular State, which 
forbids the presence of religion as such within the institutions, while it is anything but a 
                                                           
3
 For the concept of « frame », see Rydgren (2003). See also Benford and Snow (2000). 
4
 For instance, Marine Le Pen has decided to support the right to abortion of the law Weil. It was one of the 
notable discordances with her unfortunate competitor at the presidency of the FN, Bruno Gollnisch, at the 
beginning of 2011 
5
 Journal Le Monde – to be completed. 
6
 I use here the term « function » in a weak sense, as a variable mix of intended and not intended 
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secularized society, given the importance people grant to God and religion in their everyday 
life7 (Norris and Inglehart, 2011). 
But if this distinction is conceptually simple, it is historically more complicated. In Belgium 
and France, the move toward a secular State and the move toward a secularized society 
have been historically led by the same forces. In France, the « war between two Frances » 
dominated the last part of the 19th century and was put to an end by the famous law of 
separation of state and church in 1905. No same thing happened in Belgium. The Belgian 
revolution (1830) was led by a historical alliance inside the bourgeoisie between the liberal 
secularists (among which an active fraction of freemasons) and the (more or less) 
conservative catholics. This alliance was broken as soon as 1847 and for a great deal of the 
19th century the political history of Belgium is a history of competition between both forces. 
In 1884, catholics take the lead until 1919 when universal suffrage is granted and the Parti 
Ouvrier Belge (Belgian Workers’ Party) becomes the second force in parliament. 
Was there in this period an « alliance » between secularism and feminism? It is, to say the 
least, very dubious. For the whole 19th century, in France as well as in Belgium, the 
secularists (Liberals in Belgium, Republicans in France) were for instance very reluctant to 
grant the suffrage to women. In fact, women were seen under the influence of catholic 
priests and there was a fear among secularists that the vote of women could reinforce the 
influence of catholic parties (Baubérot, 2005; 2011). Universal suffrage for women was 
accorded only after WWII in both countries (1946 in France, 1948 in Belgium). In Belgium, it 
represents a time lag of 30 years. In France, the time lag is one century, which is very long 
compared to most countries and leads Youssef Courbage and Emmanuel Todd (2007) to 
speak of a specific French (republican) anti-feminism.  
During the whole period between 1850 and the end of the Second World War, it is thus 
difficult to speak of an « alliance » or even a « general convergence » between feminism and 
secularism. Women were seen rather as allied of clerics, and the convergence was effective 
only when supporting women’s claims could lead to weaken the strength of the Catholic 
Church. For instance, in both countries, the social security system elaborated just after WWII 
with a strong support of the (secularist) socialist left was based on rather patriarchal 
principles: it was a rather « Bismarckan » system of rights based on a “male bread-winner 
model”. In times of peace, the potential feminine labour force was rather encouraged to stay 
at home according to the model of traditional family and most social rights for women were 
« derived » rights, i.e. rights they received through the situation of the « head of 
household », the working man. This system was protective for the workers, but on the 
whole, it was not very in favour of women’s autonomy. 
                                                           
7
 At least, according to surveys. There could be a norm of social acceptability that would lead American 
respondents to overemphasize their religiosity, while an opposite social norm could lead respondents in some 
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This situation can be partly explained by the fact that in this whole period, the very 
preoccupation of secularism was not women’s condition but compulsory education8. Who 
was to take the lead in that matter? This was the main battlefield between liberal (or 
republican) secularists and catholics for a whole century. But the solution was very different 
in both countries. While the state school became the (very) dominant model for compulsory 
education in France, it was not the case in Belgium. Education was, at the moment of the 
independence of Belgium, essentially in the hands of the Catholic Church. A first “school 
war” opposed catholics and secularists (liberals) between 1879 and 1984 and in the end, the 
catholic party won an absolute majority for thirty years. The balance of forces never enabled 
secularists in Belgium to inverse this situation but at least, they developed a state school 
system in every municipality as a competitor to the catholic school system9. The catholic 
school system became a « functional » public service: today, catholic schools which respect 
legal conditions are mostly subsidized by the State – not exactly in the same way as state 
schools – but dispose of their organizational and pedagogical autonomy (inside legal 
conditions, of course).  
So, for the whole period that begins more or less in the midst of 19th century and that goes 
until the « golden sixties », the war between secularists and catholics, in France as well as in 
Belgium, is most of all a « school war ». To come back to Belgium, there was an ultimate 
attempt by secularists to dramatically change the situation: for the period 1954-1958 there 
was a liberal-socialist government who tried to foster state education10, but this government 
was defeated in the elections of 1958, where the christian-democrat party (successor of the 
catholic party) almost won an absolute majority in the whole country. After this, there was a 
great negotiation and a great compromise that fixed the prerogatives of the State and the 
Church in educational matters until now. This compromise was named Pacte scolaire and it 
put an official end to the « school war ». It is still the main line of organization of compulsory 
education in Belgium.  
The end of the « school war » also had very important socio-political effects: as a political 
cleavage, the secularist/catholic cleavage was put to the backstage, where it remained for 
more or less forty years11. The result was almost immediate: in the elections of 1961, the 
liberal party dramatically changed its main ideological line, ceasing to be a secularist party to 
reframe itself as a right-wing party on the socio-economic cleavage. It declared it was 
                                                           
8
 But the evidence of gender oriented stereotypes among secularist elites is also well documented (Baubérot, 
2011). It was not a specific Belgian situation of course : the scientist ideology of 19th century often showed 
despise against women and, generally, denied them a level of intelligence equal to men (Gould, 1981) 
9
 There were also efforts to develop some « non clerical » independent education institutions. The main 
success remains the Free University of Brussels (ULB/VUB) founded by the freemasons in 1834, and which is 
still today the second university in Belgium. 
10
 The expression “school war” (guerre scolaire) is commonly used by Belgian historians to speak of that period. 
11
 To be clear, this means that there was no government formed on the basis of this cleavage until 1999 (see 
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becoming open to catholics as well as to secularists and took as main ideological stance the 
defence of the « middle class » (small firms and self-employed).  
As a result, within compulsory education, more than half of all the pupils are schooled within 
catholic schools. Moreover, these schools attract a growing majority of the children coming 
from middle-class or upper middle-class families. It means that catholic schools are strongly 
supported by families who dispose of the economic and cultural capital to invest most in the 
education of their children. Catholic schools are statistically the school of the « haves » and 
more and more secularist militants – who belong themselves to rather affluent strata of the 
society – choose catholic schools for their children.  
This situation also led to a very different place of « secularism » in France and in Belgium. In 
France, the law of 1905 that organizes the separation between the Church and the State has 
officially split, we could say, the question of secularism from that of secularization. Although 
the word « laïcité » (secularism) is not present as such within the law, historians from both 
camps consider that secularism is inscribed as a principle of the organization of the French 
State12. So, if there still exist « anti-religious » movements in France, there is no 
« secularist » movement as such: secularism is claimed by every fraction of the society as a 
« common good »13. The Belgian context is far from being so clear-cut. Constitutionally, 
Belgium functions with a system of « recognized cults or worldviews»14. As we have seen, 
the school remains a dormant conflict between secularists and catholics15. Sociologically, 
Belgian civil society has been predominantly organized along « pillars » (mainly the catholic 
one and the socialist/secularist one), which take people in charge from birth to death: 
education, health, participation to unions, to youth movements or non-profit organizations, 
and even funerals can be organized by catholic or secular institutions. Sure, the strength of 
those pillars has strongly weakened since the « silent revolution », but they are still alive, 
mainly within education. 
So, there exists a « secularist movement », mainly in French speaking Belgium (Centre 
d’Action Laïque) that promotes both secularism as an institutional objective and fights again 
religion as a moral/ideological reference16. 
This maintains a strong confusion between secularism as an institutional device and atheism 
as a personal philosophy. The statutes of the Centre d’Action Laïque explicitly define 
                                                           
12
 The principle of “laïcité” will in fact be inscribed in the French Constitution, but only after WWII.  
13
 With some exceptions as the « Union of secularist families », which overtly claims anti-religious positions. 
14
 Until now: Catholic, Protestant, Judaic, Anglican, Orthodox, Muslim, Buddhist, Humanist secularists. 
15
 To be true, it is partly the case in France too. In 1984, under the Presidency of François Mitterrand, the 
French government was obliged by a huge demonstration to abandon a law intending to put private school 
under the control of the government. A bit more than ten years later, there was a move in the opposite 
direction: the public school was defended by great demonstrations. But the problem of education is of a 
different nature in France, because private school scholarizes a much smaller part of the pupils.  
16
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« laïcité » as being both secularism such as we have defined it, and « the personal 
conception of a life without any God »17. So, being at the same time a believer and a 
secularist appears as a strange mix, at odds with traditional lines of ideological cleavages in 
Belgian society. 
In this situation, after the end of the “school war”, the secularist/catholic cleavage was 
weakened and residual as a political cleavage. But it was to be renewed among public 
opinion for what could seem to be an « ultimate battle », which was the « culture wars » of 
1970-2000. 
2. The silent revolution: a true alliance? 
The cooling of the religious cleavage in Belgium, in the end, did not boost the socio-
economic cleavage because of the global transformation of the relations between capital 
and labour that we can trace back to the very beginning of the seventies. 
The socio-economic cleavage itself was progressively weakened in all western countries by 
the process of « silent value revolution », which was described, among others, by Ronald 
Inglehart (Inglehart, 1977, 1997. Welzel and Inglehart, 2005)18. The main idea can be in a 
very sketchy way described as follows: at the end of the sixties, in all Western countries, a 
new generation began to reach political majority and enter in the « battlefield ». This 
generation was the first one not to have lived in war or inter-war periods. It had been 
socialized within a period of great improvement of material living conditions, and as a result, 
the basis of its political values were to be found more in such needs as affiliation, self-
esteem, self-actualization and less in needs of material security or subsistence. The idea that 
a kind of « Silent Revolution » has taken place from the end of the sixties in most 
industrialized countries is now widely accepted, even if the detailed explanatory schemes of 
Inglehart remain controversial19. 
Within the new « postmaterialist » or « postmodern » values20, one subset takes a very 
important place: it is the value of « free disposal of self », which links gender questions (the 
right of women to decide whether or not to have children) and questions of sexual freedom 
(equal right to choose for both sexes, equal respect for all sexual orientations, rejection of 
puritanism). In Belgium, one issue at least was to produce in this new context a strong 
                                                           
17
 Article 4 of the statutory rule of Centre d’Action Laïque. 
18
 Of course this « silent revolution » should be placed within the frame of the structural transformations of 
capitalism, but this is clearly outside the reach of this paper. 
19
 For instance, in The Silent Revolution, Inglehart considers the new regionalist movements as an instance of 
« postmaterialism », and he even cites Belgium as an example. But in the three decades that followed, in most 
European countries, it is the Radical Right that takes the lead in matter of regionalism, which is completely 
contradictory to Inglehart’s intuition. No need to say this cleavage on regionalism has progressively become the 
dominant cleavage in Belgium. 
20
 In his reelaboration of 1997, Inglehart considers « postmaterialism » as a subset of a global value cluster 
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alliance between secularism and feminism: the right to abortion21. Secularists, feminists, and 
freemasons converged from the end of the sixties in a new battlefield: women’s bodies. In 
that case the convergence was straightforward: no institution is more reluctant to abortion 
than the Catholic Church. The situation is the more difficult that the weakening of the 
secularist/catholic cleavage had the paradoxical effect of putting catholic parties even more 
in the centre of the Belgian political system. 
Indeed, the end of the « school war » has produced a new situation in which the new liberal 
party (see above), reframed as a right wing party, is now strongly opposed to the socialists. It 
means that the catholic party (now christian-democrat), although constantly declining within 
the constituency because of the diminishing number of « engaged » catholics, has become 
almost indispensable in every governmental coalition: it has switched to the centre on the 
socio-economic cleavage (which remains the key of government formation) and so it can be 
part either of a centre-left alliance (with socialists) or a centre-right alliance (with liberals), 
while the possibility of a liberal-socialist alliance has appeared for almost four decades as 
practically closed. 
At the same time, the pressure towards changing the very repressive law on abortion was 
emerging from a growing part of Belgian society (including a number of progressive catholic 
movements). Indeed, it was not only a philosophical matter but also a social one: abortion, 
though strictly prohibited in Belgium, was largely practised. But women with sufficient 
resources were able to abort abroad in safe conditions, while women from « blue collar » 
condition were obliged to rely on clandestine practitioners with a number of strong physical 
injuries or even deaths. This situation was exerting a heavy pressure on the catholic party, 
which was still unavoidable to form a government but which knew very well that he had lost 
the majority within public opinion on that matter.  
The vote of the law took a dramatic turn. The new law organizing the right to abortion was 
passed in 1990, under a government uniting socialists and christian-democrats. But christian-
democrats (in the majority) voted against the law, while a great deal of liberal MP’s and of 
ecologists (both in the opposition) voted in favour and so the law was adopted. A stronger 
dramatization took place when the King refused to approve the law. This was unprecedented 
in the history of Belgian monarchy: constitutionally, the King cannot express a personal 
opinion and therefore, he cannot refuse to approve a law. To avoid the problem, the 
government decided that the King was temporarily « not in capacity to reign », and in those 
circumstances (which normally apply only when the King is mad or ill or during war 
occupation), all the Ministers signed the law. 
The law in favour of abortion can be considered as a true alliance between secularists and 
feminists, who on this question share the same values and together want to weaken the grip 
                                                           
21
 This was the most striking conflict and the « core » of the dispute, but to be complete we should of course 
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of the Catholic Church on Belgian society, which is becoming everyday more secularized. This 
has given liberals and socialists the idea that, even if they are in strong disagreement about 
socio-economic matters, they should govern together to bury once and for all the 
secularist/catholic cleavage. The opportunity was given in 1999 around a dramatic ecological 
crisis. The Ecologist parties won more than 15 % of the vote at national level. Socialists and 
liberals decided to form a government together taking the ecologists on board, and this 
government (« rainbow government ») initiated what was probably one of the most 
« postmaterialist » legislations in the world, including making divorce a formality, accepting 
homosexual marriage and a very liberal law on euthanasia (Jacquemain, 2002). 
This could have been the terminal phase of the secularist/catholic cleavage, the more so that 
the Catholic Church is now very annoyed by a lot of scandals about paedophile practices 
among the priests.  
But meanwhile, the question of Islam had progressively emerged. 
3. A new alliance against Islam? 
The alliance between secularism and feminism around the questions of contraception and 
mainly abortion between 1970 and 2000 has given birth to a narrative where both go 
« naturally » hand in hand. It was probably true in that period, but, in a larger context, we 
have seen that things are more complex. Moreover, even after these three decades of 
common struggle, the sociological composition of the « hardcore » of secularist militants, as 
far as we can know, is still at odds with any kind of « postmaterialist stance ». For instance, 
the two main masonic organizations in Belgium, the Grand Orient de Belgique and the 
Grande loge de Belgique still refuse to accept women as members. A survey about the public 
of the Centre d’Action laïque in a Belgian province (Jacquemain, Jamin and Pieters, 2009) 
showed that among members and sympathizers, aged well-educated males are strongly 
over-represented. One lacks data, but interviews with members show that macho or 
homophobic attitudes are probably no less present than in the overall population. 
So, even if secularism has been allied with feminism for that period, it still remains not quite 
clear if it was a structural or a circumstantial alliance. 
The emergence of Islam, which has strongly penetrated public debate in France and in 
Belgium, has completely reframed the ideological context. It has polarized attitudes within 
the secularist and the feminist movements, giving birth to two opposite alliances.  
In the first alliance, we can find feminists such as Elisabeth Badinter quoted above (and in 
part Susan Möller Okin), who consider that in western societies, violence and oppression 
against women is mainly confined to cultural minorities, i.e. immigrants. These feminists are 
allied to secularists who consider that the struggle for secularism is in the end a struggle for 
secularization: from this point of view, religion is considered as an archaism that requires 
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this is the position of the French philosopher Henri Peña Ruiz (2003) – member of the French 
Communist Party and adviser of Jean-Luc Mélenchon. For this alliance, the visible presence 
of Islam in European society is the sign of a regression both of women’s rights and of 
rationality. 
In the second alliance are involved feminists who consider that muslin women are victims 
twice: they are the victims of patriarchal rules (within global society and within their own 
community), but moreover, they are victims of racism, just as are the male members of their 
communities. In this group of feminists, we notably find Christine Delphy (2006; 2010) who 
does not hesitate to qualify Elisabeth Badinter as a « revisionist »: the way Badinter 
considers immigrant males as the fundamental (and almost unique) source of violence 
against women is a way of concealing the structural violence within the French (and Belgian) 
society. And alongside those feminists, we find secularists like Jean Baubérot (2005, 2011), 
or philosophers like Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor (2011), and even islamologists like 
Olivier Roy (2005), who defends that secularism is a political principle of separation that 
cannot be confounded with an anti-religious device. 
This is of course a rough distinction and there are nuances that should be made, but it seems 
that this distinction fits the public debate rather well and that most actors very well know in 
which « camp » they are22. To avoid to semantically dismiss one position from the beginning, 
I will call the first alliance the « republican » camp and the second the « liberal » one. 
Assuming that I am myself within the « liberal » camp, but that the « republicans » are 
strongly the majority among militant secularists, I will dedicate the remaining part of the 
paper to an argument (far from complete of course) against the republican stance23. 
a) The emergence of the veil problem in France. 
At the end of the 1980s and the very beginning of the 1990s, some « headscarf affairs » 
emerged in the media and the public debate in France (Tevanian, 2005; Baubérot, 2005). A 
first « veil affair » developed in 1989 around two young Muslim girls that were expulsed 
from their schools because they wanted to wear the Muslim headscarf (Laborde, 2008, 
2010; Baubérot, 2005). The Conseil d’Etat broke the decision for it was creating 
discriminations without any legal bases. 
Affairs of this kind got more and more numerous in the fifteen years that followed. The 
reasons for this are easy to understand and I will briefly enumerate them because they are 
the same as for Belgium. The first one is probably the consciousness by Muslim immigrants 
                                                           
22
 The fracture within both secularist and feminist movements makes it difficult, nevertheless, to draw clear 
frontiers. Within the Centre d’Action Laïque, for instance, it is patent that the movement in Brussels, a 
multicultural city, is much more open and tolerant than in the old industrial suburbs of the Walloon cities. 
Among feminists, the Christian movements (« Vie Féminine », for instance) appear much more open than the 
socialist movements (« Femmes prévoyantes socialistes »). But even those organizations are divided.  
23
 The expression « militant secularists » is important, because a great amount of Belgians are « de facto » - but 
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(among whom many had in fact turned to be French citizens, either by naturalization of by 
birth in France) that they had become permanent residents. So the choice to refrain from 
manifesting their religious convictions in order to make their « stay » easier had ceased to 
make sense: what can be considered as acceptable as a temporary « reserve » cannot be 
maintained for ever. So a number of sociologists (Tévanian, 2005; Baubérot, 2005, 
Martiniello, 2011) described this situation as a sign of integration from part of these muslin 
citizens. 
But a great deal of feminists and secularists did not see it this way. For most of them, the 
muslim headscarf was seen as an unambiguous sign of submission of women. So the 
spreading of the veil was seen as the result of a new offensive strategy of « bottom up re-
islamization », coming in no way from the free will of women, but from clerics inspired 
either by the Iranian revolution (1979) or the renewal of Salafism in Saudi Arabia. Probably 
there is a grain of truth in the idea of a pressure coming from outside. But the convincing 
explanation should take into account precisely this will of the new generations to be 
recognized as at the same time muslims and true French citizens. It should take into account 
all mechanisms of « identity reaffirmation », that is, not only collective identity (belonging to 
a community who reclaims its self-esteem), but also individual identity: the – too few – 
sociological studies tend to show that a number of young muslim women (not all of course) 
who decide to wear the hijab give to that decision the meaning of asserting their autonomy 
from their parents and from men in general (Chouder & al, 2008). 
But the majority of French (and Belgian) society is not in a position to see all these nuances, 
and this for at least four reasons. The first one is the amplification of the crisis of labour 
integration coming for the very rapid weakening of the « fordist » model: the theme of 
« exclusion » from labour force as a new process of domination24 has been strongly 
documented by sociologists (Castel, 1995; Rosanvallon, 1995). The proposal of the French 
philosopher Joel Roman (2006) is that in this situation, belonging to « national community » 
is immediately at stake, because it is no longer mediated by all the ties that were linked to 
labour organization. And there is a global tension around cultural symbols of this belonging. 
The veil is then characterized as a “rejection of assimilation” as citizens. The second reason 
to reject this « more visible » islam is the search of a scapegoat in times of socio-economic 
difficulties. So, among the « historically culturally French », exclusion easily leads to a raising 
xenophobia and veiled women are a visible, salient target. The third reason is that this 
xenophobia can be « reframed » as an acceptable moral position by the presence of an 
explicit political offer: Jens Rydgren (2003), among others, has shown that the effect of the 
presence of the Front National within the political offer from the beginning of the 1980s 
                                                           
24
 A « new » process, because exclusion has been replacing « exploitation ». A recurrent theme from 
sociologists is that while conflict between labour and capital around the sharing of the fruits of production is an 
« integrating » conflict, exclusion from the labour force offers no such possibility and is a « desintegrating » 
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helped to make xenophobia a « respectable » opinion25. And fourthly, there has been a 
strong help from the international context: the attacks of 11th September 2001 and the 
aggressive military reactions that followed helped to build a new narrative of the « clash of 
civilizations » (Huntington, 1996) that made Muslims within Western countries perceived as 
some kind of a « fifth column » of the « Muslim world » in the context of the civilization 
wars. 
In France, this « veil war » ended (officially, of course) in 2004, when, after the work of the 
« Stasi Commission », a law was passed that prohibited all religious signs for pupils in State 
schools, that is to say in the overwhelming majority of education institutions. It is true that 
this « Stasi commission », alongside this interdiction, proposed some measures of « mutual 
recognition » (for instance, changing the agenda of holidays to introduce some Jewish and 
Muslim holidays). But for the reasons briefly exposed above, French society was not in a 
condition to introduce all those nuances. Moreover, as was remarked by most analysts 
(Laborde, 2008; Baubérot, 2005 ; Roy, 2005), this law was formulated to essentially target 
muslim headscarf, even if this was not formulated explicitly (which would have been 
prohibited by the very principle of French « laïcité »). 
 
b) The « cut and paste conflict » in French-speaking Belgium 
How did the situation evolve in Belgium? The « veil problem » developed later. In fact, there 
are good reasons to think it emerged partly by contagion from the French situation. Indeed, 
the issues emerged in the public debate mainly after the case was « closed » in France, and 
probably under the influence of the new French law, a part of the secularist movement was 
seen as a « success » of secularization. 
For reasons of differences in culture, language and organization of education, it is difficult to 
speak of the situation for « Belgium » as such and so, in what follows, I will limit myself to 
the situation within the French-speaking community26.  
                                                           
25
 The recent French elections of 2012 (both presidential and legislative) have convincingly shown this “shaping 
effect” of the presence of a radical right populist party on public opinion in general. 
26
 For an international public, it is probably useful to say a word of the constitutional organization of Belgium. It 
is a federal State, composed of three regions and three communities. The regions are territorial entities. The 
communities can be described – to say it simply – as « linguistic » entities. Regions and communities do not 
match perfectly: the Flemish Region is included within the Flemish community. The Walloon Region is mainly 
included within the French speaking community, but also includes a small German speaking community. The 
Region of Brussels has a special status and depends on both communities. There are no linguistic statistics, for 
they are prohibited in Belgium, but all indices show there are more or less 90 percent in Brussels who have 
French as their main language and 10 percent who have Dutch. One very important thing is that Brussels has 
become within the last 30 years a very multicultural city, with a population of « muslim culture » (true believer 
or not) estimated around 25 percent. 
The communities are competent for all cultural matters, education and health, while the regions are 
competent for many economic and territorial matters. Justice, Foreign affairs, Military subjects and Social 
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A little time after the French law of 2004, a radical fringe of the secularist movement 
(outside the official Centre d’Action Laïque) began to militate for a law banning the veil for 
pupils in State schools. It was probably at the beginning a « cut and paste » movement from 
what had happened in France. This radical fringe had always looked at « Laïque » France as 
the « true » model of secularization, an ideal that was to be defended against the messy 
situation of « pillarized » Belgium, where the weight of the Catholic Church was thought to 
be unbearable (Geerts, 2009). 
It may seem strange, at first sight, that this new « republican » agitation began just after the 
great victories of secularization at the very beginning of the 21st century (see section 2 
above). But at second look, the move is quite evident: these victories had mobilized 
secularists and given the impetus to go further. At the very moment Belgium had become 
one of the most secularized countries in the world27, a new « enemy » seemed to emerge, 
i.e. the transformation of « invisible » Belgian islam into a more assertive and demanding 
form of religion. It seems natural for the energy accumulated by the most radical fringe of 
the secularist movement to be deflected against what is perceived as an “emerging threat” , 
probably more « dangerous » than the Catholic Church itself, which has lost its grip on the 
great majority of the Belgian population. A part of the feminist movement is in the same 
state of mind: it is unbearable for this movement to see young women beginning to 
vindicate what those feminists see as an unambiguous sign of patriarchal domination28. 
The fact that the battlefield is education again also has important consequences. The reason 
is that education has become a very competitive sector in Belgium. Efforts to restrict free 
choice of the school by the parents have largely been defeated. As a consequence, there is 
little social mix and huge inequalities of results among schools – and therefore among 
pupils29. The schools have many possibilities to « select » their public and this produces a 
strong segregation effect. The veil, then, becomes a « symbolic sign »: schools that tolerate 
it quickly attract many young muslim girls (and boys) who are among the less privileged part 
of the population. So they lose their pupils coming from middle class and upper middle class 
families. The phenomenon becomes important in Brussels, where a great proportion of 
pupils have grown within muslim culture (it does not mean, of course, that all those pupils 
are believers). 
So, there are understandable reasons for the radical fringe of the secularist movement to 
enter into this battlefield and to claim the legal prohibition of the veil by law. Their main 
                                                           
27
 At least through its legislation. But the decline of Belgian catholicism is still going on and it makes Belgium 
resemble more and more the Lutheran countries of northern Europe. 
28
 I could be defended that the secularist organizations in Belgium were suffering the « loss of their enemies » 
and that this “displacement” against islam has also been a way of maintaining a minimum of institutional 
vitality within the movement. But this hypothesis should be tested against empirical evidence. 
29
 The Pisa surveys have constantly shown that the differences of results between pupils are very large in 




Is Secularism so good for Women? – Marc Jacquemain   Page 13 
 
argument is that without that prohibition, school managers are « left alone » and have to try 
to manage problems that are outside their reach. 
But this campaign soon leads to ideological consequences that are not so different from 
what they are in France: it reframes xenophobia as a « respectable » position when it is 
targeted to Islam, conceived as a dangerous and archaic religion, which tries to impose its 
norms to the Belgian society. Young women wanting to wear the hijab are seen at best as 
« manipulated » by the males of their community, and at worse, as victims of a cruel 
oppression from their fathers, brothers or mothers. This ideological move extends to the 
secularist movement as a whole (with a few dissenters), and with the help of the media, the 
conditions for some kind of a « moral panic » are created. 
Progressively, the conflict will go outside the school. Some « symbolic » events in all spheres 
of society will encourage a fantasized view of Islam. A few of them are very representative. 
In 2006, a local welfare centre refuses to grant a welfare benefit to a veiled woman if she 
does not take it off. The argument is perfectly illegal: it says that, being received in a public 
local, the woman cannot show off her religion beliefs and is obliged to remain « neutral ». 
This example was sufficiently « eccentric » to be echoed by the media30, but it was the first 
clear attempt to extend the obligation of « neutrality » from institutions to citizens. 
In September 2009, a young Belgian woman of Turkish origin, Mahinur Ozdemir, is elected a 
member of the regional parliament of Brussels and presents herself there with a headscarf. 
The opposition parties protested strongly (although the Freedom of opinion of members of 
parliament is constitutionally even more protected than the freedom of opinion of ordinary 
citizens), and the polemics lasted for weeks. 
On April 28th 2011, a law prohibiting wearing the Niqab in public (which is wrongly confused 
with « burqa » in the text) is voted by all members of the federal parliament but one (a 
Flemish ecologist). This was probably the first law to reach such unanimous approbation for 
a very long time: the country had been profoundly divided between Flemings and Walloons 
at the elections of 2009 and was left without any government for more than eighteen 
months31! 
These events that may seem anecdotic are all examples of the global « reframing » of Islam 
as a barbaric misogynistic religion and of secularism as a « shield » against it. Outside the 
questions of women’s patriarchal domination, Islam has remained within the media for all 
                                                           
30
 La Libre Belgique, 27/10/2006 
31
 It should be interesting here to investigate the sociological effects of the law. Very recently (June 2012) 
attacks were committed against policemen by islamic radicals coming from outside Belgium. The Niqab, which 
could be seen as a very marginal « problem » (if any) before the law, has now become a serious problem 
because of the law. It fuels both violent radical islamism on the one side, and on the other side, a radical « law 
and order » ideology within mainly (but not only) right wing parties. In a (somewhat outdated) sociological 
frame, we could see that the latent function of the ban law is to fuel conflictuality and to make radicalism more 
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kinds of reasons. Quite recently, a Member of Parliament published an opinion in a 
newspaper protesting against the alleged (but not confirmed) fact that some prison 
managers had banned pork from the meals of prisoners, in order to avoid preparing two 
different kinds of meat. Indeed, in some jails, the majority or prisoners are of muslim 
culture. In April 2012, a TV broadcast of the public television was titled «Should we be afraid 
of islam » and indeed presented misogynist (but not illegal) discourse by some imam that 
had been secretly filmed. 
One could describe the development of this new « islamophobia » for pages and pages. The 
reasons why this is in line with public opinion in French-speaking Belgium are not very 
different from what they are in France. It is clear that this « alliance » between (a part of) the 
secularist movement and (a part of) the feminist movement, which I called the 
« republican » alliance, has strong counterproductive effects in the shaping of xenophobia as 
a respectable feeling and ideology. But nevertheless, is there not some defensible rationale 
for this alliance? 
c) Turning to the normative point of view 
If we come back to the position of Susan Möller Okin, which was cited at the beginning of 
this paper, there is clearly a core of truth: western societies (in this case, the « mainstream » 
French-speaking societies) are altogether more favourable to women than almost all other 
cultures, and then, we should be very careful in according group rights to minorities that 
could use them to worsen the situation of women inside their communities. I will not try to 
contest this argument (that I believe to be true, but within some limits), but I would like to 
conclude by trying to explain why it does not seem relevant in the context of the Belgian 
“anti-Islam war”. 
The first reason is that, as far as I know, in the Belgian situation, muslims do not claim rights 
that could deteriorate the situation of the members of their community, nor even rights that 
could be enforced against members of their community (excepted the normal parental rights 
that are recognized to all Belgian citizens). There is no demand for being judged by 
« communitarian » laws or courts, except maybe within some small fringes of radical 
islamists that receive no support from muslims in general, and still less from « liberal » 
secularists. What seems to happen, on the contrary, is a move from a part of mainstream 
society to restrict cultural individual rights in an ever growing field of social life: right to wear 
the clothes one judges appropriate, right to eat the way one wants to eat, right to express 
one’s faith in public. All things considered, this move seems to be the real slippery slope in 
the Belgian situation: the republican secularists are asking more and more prohibitions, 
because the main point does not seem to prevent damages against women, but making 
muslims go back to their « previous invisibility ». It may be true that the situation of women 
within immigrant muslim communities, all things considered, is worse that within 
« mainstream » society, but this does not require inventing new laws, new offences or new 
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social work and mainly fewer discriminations, in short, an alliance based on efforts to 
promote social justice (in difficult conditions), and not on a criminalization of behaviours 
that are not offensive as such.  
True, freedom is not the whole thing to make a society hold together. Republican secularism 
often quotes the famous sentence by Lacordaire « Entre le faible et le fort, entre le riche et le 
pauvre, entre le maître et le serviteur, c’est la liberté qui opprime et la loi qui libère ». This 
rejoins another argument by Okin: feminists are very sensitive to the oppression within 
private structures such as family. This is a point one cannot reject easily if one wants to take 
equality seriously. The question here is that to some extent a kind of « state paternalism » is 
justified in order to protect the weakest. It is the reason why even liberal secularists carefully 
consider the possibility to ban the hijab in schools for some categories of age, for instance. 
But it must be admitted that the prohibitionist stance hardly protects women: in any case, 
the sanction is imposed to them and not to those who are supposed to be their oppressors. 
In the famous case of the « anti-burqa » law, sanctions are imposed to the women who wear 
the niqab in public: they may be fined, or even, in the worst case, they may be sent to jail. It 
is hard to see how it will improve their situation. A number of police officers have already 
said that this law seemed inapplicable, anyway. From a consequentiality point of view, this 
law seems thus very difficult to justify. Moreover, a very recent study by Eva Brems, of the 
Ghent University32 has shown that many women in niqab wear it voluntarily and that it 
confers them a strong « feeling of liberty and self-esteem ». Even if we take into account the 
possibility of adaptative preference, it seems clear that the most probable effect of this 
prohibition will be to keep these women home and not to lead them to take off their niqabs. 
I am not quite sure that State paternalism is always better than religious paternalism. We 
should be careful about that and a charge of adaptive preferences must not too easily be 
deduced from a behaviour that goes outside our mainstream social norms. As Cecile Laborde 
(2008) puts it quite clearly and extensively, the role of the State is to give everybody the 
means to live an autonomous life (with a special attention to the weakest). It is not to force 
people to live autonomously33.  
But if we now turn off from the niqab, which is quantitatively a minor problem, to the veil 
(hijab), republican secularists, along their own line of reasoning, should be very prone to 
protect muslim women against what is becoming the plague of our societies: unemployment 
and exclusion. On the contrary, the suspicion that has extended to everything that looks like 
muslim is a heavy burden for women34, because, on a strong secularist line, they should be 
obliged to take off their veils if they want to be employed within the public service. It is hard 
to see how this could help women to reinforce their autonomy. But there is here something 
even worse: as public service is less and less distinguishable from private sector (many tasks 
                                                           
32
 Quoted in Courrier International, 2012-05-17. 
33
 This would be a double bind anyway. 
34
 Many observers have noted that only women are under such scrutiny. The male symbolic or religious signs, 
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that seem to pertain to public service are now delegated to private firms), some private 
firms now try to ban the veil on the argument that it “disturbs their clients”. Until now, 
courts have discarded that argument as discriminatory. But many lawyers insist on the fact 
that jurisprudence is changing and that justice could cease to be, in a near future, on the 
side of working women. So, in what is probably the most crucial point – offering muslim 
women real opportunities to get jobs and financial autonomy –, the republican secularist 
strategy seems dangerously counterproductive. 
My second argument can be summarized that way: trying to make muslim women more 
autonomous by prohibiting them to dress according to what they express as their desires 
can be efficient only at three conditions : 1) if their wearing the veil is mainly (or purely) a 
decision of submission from their part; 2) if they feel ready to use the prohibition as an 
opportunity to revolt against that submission and 3) if confronted with that opportunity, 
they are able to impose their oppressors their choice to take off the dress in order to be able 
to stay in the streets or to keep their jobs. It is hard to see, for all empirical knowledge we 
have until now, how the conjunction of those three conditions could be satisfied in more 
than a few cases. So we can say that, on the whole, and surely with qualifications and 
exceptions, the “state paternalist” strategy to make muslim women more autonomous will 
be self-defeating.  
There is a third reason to be sceptical about the prohibitionist move: if we want to help 
people to be autonomous, even accepting that there could be a rationale for a dose of 
paternalism, it never seems justified to disqualify the « victims » themselves as interlocutors. 
It is a form of disrespect that invalidates any set of « good intentions ». Helping people (in 
this case, women) to get out of possible tricky situations of (more or less) accepted 
submission always begins with a recognition of those people as having their word to say in 
the process. The most reluctant characteristic of the (most extreme) republican secularism is 
indeed the fact that the words of women wearing the niqab (or even the hijab) are never 
taken seriously. They are not invited to participate to debates about their situation. They are 
not invited to intervene in the legislative process. There is no serious attempt to give 
empirical support to the fact that those women are dominated, or manipulated, and to what 
extent. In fact, most (not all) republican secularists impose to those women an 
“infantilization” (treat them as children) they would never accept for themselves, in any 
circumstance. 
Moreover, and this is the fourth reason for scepticism, there is in fact among republican 
secularists a double narrative about veiled women, which is radically contradictory. They are 
considered as dominated, submitted women who cannot get free by themselves, nor 
express an autonomous judgement. But at the same time, they are strongly accused of 
wearing the veil only for the pleasure of transgression or for strategic reasons (to increase 
the visibility of Islam). It is difficult to see how both accusations can hold at the same time. 
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veiled young women and described something which is neither submission nor strategy, but 
indeed, a kind of « assertive transgression » : many of the young women they talked with 
described some absolute desire of being « truly themselves » (which is in fact very in line 
with the mainstream individualist culture). And they often decided to wear the veil against 
their family’s will. Surely, this is not the whole story. But it is a possible indication of what is 
really at stake: it is very difficult for feminists or for secularists to recognize that there can be 
a way toward emancipation or self-assertion that could be very different from the one those 
“white secularist feminists” have chosen for themselves. 
I would like to add a fifth argument, which is specific to French-speaking Belgium. Being a 
former catholic society, Belgium has retained a lot of catholic traditions that are still 
widespread, even in our secular society. For instance, it is not so uncommon to see a nun 
walking in her traditional dress. This dress is surely « stricter » than the hijab and barely less 
strict than the niqab. But it never raises any problem. If we take the republican secularists 
argument seriously, it is hard to see why it is so totally different (and so much worse) to 
decide to wear a niqab than to decide to wear a nun’s dress, which implies an explicit 
engagement to obedience and an explicit renunciation of sexuality. To be true, there are no 
longer many nuns in my country, but in any case still more than muslim women in niqab. 
How is it that nobody ever proposed a law to fine them or to send them to jail? At another 
level, it seems unbearable that a muslim father imposes the veil to his young daughter (and I 
can partially agree). But it seems perfectly normal that a christian father imposes a catholic 
sacrament (communion) to his six-year-old child. The conclusion seems to be that the 
problem is not religion as such, but alien religion. At any rate, the way public debate is 
framed cannot but lead muslim people to see things that way. 
This last argument is of uttermost importance in Belgium. Until now, there has been no 
decision to ban or not the hijab in state schools. There is a strong lobbying from republican 
secularists. But there are also proposals of compromise coming from other associations: to 
ban the hijab for pupils until sixteen, but to impose freedom for pupils over sixteen35. But 
one thing is sure: nobody is now able to impose « neutrality » to the catholic schools. So, if 
the ban for state schools is finally voted, Belgians muslims will be confronted to some 
strange situation: their religious signs will be prohibited in half the schools in the name of 
secularism and they will be prohibited in the other half in the name of catholicism36. It is 
difficult to see how it would not be considered as a global (hypocritical) discrimination. 
None of the preceding argument is undisputable of course.  But together, it seems that they 
build a strong case against the « republican alliance ».  
 
                                                           
35
 This proposal comes from a process of intercultural dialogue initiated by the former Minister of Integration, 
but which has received no follow-up so far. 
36
 As a matter of fact, the hijab is already banned in the overwhelming majority of state schools and of catholic 








I have reviewed three moments of alliance between secularism and feminism in Belgium, in 
order to answer my initial question. Is secularism so good for women? At first sight, if we 
follow Okin’s argument, the answer should be a straightforward « yes ». But of the three 
periods considered, this answer is clear for only the second one. In the first period and in the 
third period, things are much more mitigated, to say the least. The sake of women is a true 
concern for the secularist movement. But at the same time, it also appears as a battlefield in 
its everlasting struggle against religion. If we broaden the perspective, we could say that at 
the world’s scale, religious systems are no doubt much worse for women. But is it so sure? 
Was the condition of women so good in Stalin’s URSS, in Maoist China, in Red Khmers’ 
Cambodia? 
In the words of Baubérot, we could say that the attitude of today’s republican secularists 
toward Muslim women is not so different from the distrust against women in the offensive 
secularism of the 19th century: in both cases, women are accused to be manipulated by 
clerics and to be unable to put an end to that manipulation by themselves. So they need the 
intervention of well-intended (paternalist white) males and should be glad to receive it. 
I am not at all qualified to tell if there can exist a religion without patriarchalism. But it 
seems highly plausible that there exists patriarchalism without religion. 
June 2012 
I would like to thank Geoffroy Matagne (University of Liege) Jean-François Husson (CIFOP) 
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